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STUDENT NOTE
CURRENT HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW: TIME TO STOP
DEFENDANTS FROM HAVING THEIR CAKE
AND EATING IT TOO
CATHLEEN MARIE MOGAN*
A standard that supposedly treats men and women the same begs
the question: "the same as whom?"'
We acknowledge that men and women are vulnerable in different
ways and offended by different behavior. 2
For the first few weeks, James, as he occasionally did with other
female employees at the office, made sexual overtures to--in the
vernacular of the modern generation, "came on to"--her.
Although Plaintif rejected these efforts, her initial rejections were
neither unpleasant nor unambiguous, and gaveJames no reason to
believe his moves were unwelcome. "3
As evidenced by the recent confirmation hearings of Jus-
tice Thomas of the United States Supreme Court, sexual har-
assment in the workplace is an issue which is generating
growing concern. To date, sexual harassment has been dealt
with in a patchwork fashion-plaintiffs bring claims through
private company complaint procedures, through the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) complaint
procedures, through federal courts under the auspices of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and through the state
courts under more general torts such as extreme and outra-
geous behavior and severe and emotional distress. None of
* B.A., 1989 University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1992 Notre
Dame Law School; Thos. J. White Scholar 1990-1992.
1. CATHARINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
174 (1979).
2. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987).
3. Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir.
1990).
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these remedies have proven satisfactory-in particular, the rec-
ord of Title VII claims in the federal courts has been disap-
pointing. The time has come to confront the problem head on.
The ultimate solution may be a federal statute, tailored to
address specifically the issue of sexual harassment. In the
absence of such a federal statute, this paper proposes both
reforming and unifying Title VII claims, and developing a state
law tort of sexual harassment. Part I of this paper will trace the
development of the Title VII sexual harassment claim of hostile
work environment. Part II will propose ways to resolve ques-
tions remaining open in hostile work environment claims. Part
III will discuss the larger issues-the tensions between free
expression rights and equality rights, between federal and state
law, and between competing policies of equality and compensa-
tion. Part IV will conclude that reforming and unifying the ele-
ments of Title VII claims, as well as developing a separate tort
for sexual harassment in the state courts, will provide a remedy
for both the plaintiff who only wants to go back to work in an
environment cleared of sexual harassment, and the plaintiff
who has been seriously harmed and wants compensatory and
punitive damages.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM OF
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT IN THE CIRCUIT
COURTS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that no
employer shall "discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his [or her]
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."' 4 Under Title VII, sexual harassment claims
are brought in federal courts as a type of sex discrimination.
The federal courts have divided sexual harassment claims into
two types: "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment." 5
Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a victim loses tangible
job benefits for rejecting sexual advances. Hostile work envi-
ronment harassment occurs when a victim is sexually harassed
so that her working conditions become offensive and unbear-
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
5. In practice, "[h]ostile environment and quid pro quo harassment
causes of action are not always clearly distinct and separate. The
discrimination which gives rise to them is not neatly compartmentalized but
... the two types of claims may be complementary to one another." Carrero
v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989).
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able, but she is not necessarily denied any tangible job benefits.
This paper is concerned primarily with hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment.
The Eleventh Circuit laid out what is required to establish
a prima facie case for hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment under Title VII in 1982 in Henson v. City of Dundee.6 In
Dundee, two female police dispatchers alleged sexual harass-
ment by the chief of the police department.7 The harassment
included "numerous harangues of demeaning sexual inquiries
and vulgarities," and repeated requests for sexual relations.8
The court adopted this prima facie case:
The plaintiff must prove that 1) she belongs to a pro-
tected group; 2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment; 3) the harassment was based on sex; 4) the
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and 5) the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment in question and failed to take
prompt remedial action.9
The court held that determining whether sexual harassment is
sufficiently severe and persistent to affect a condition of
employment "is a question to be determined with regard to the
totality of the circumstances."'" With respect to the first ele-
ment, the court noted that the plaintiff need only prove that he
or she is a man or a woman." Regarding the second element,
that the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment,
the court meant unwelcome "in the sense that the employee
did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee
regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive ... [which is]
an evidentiary question well within the courts' ability to
resolve."' 2 In the third element, that the harassment was based
on sex, the court noted that in most cases, it will be easy for a
female to prove that but for her sex, she would not have been
6. 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
7. Id. at 899.
8. Id. While I realize that a detailed review of the particular facts of
these cases may well be offensive to some readers, an appreciation of what
has actually been said and done in these work environments is indispensable
to a realistic understanding of the issues in sexual harassment cases.
Consequently, throughout this essay I review the factual bases for the sexual
harassment claims.
9. Id. at 903-05.
10. Id. at 904 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)(1981)).
11. Id. at 903.
12. Id.
19921
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harassed by her male supervisor. However, the court further
noted that
there may be cases in which a supervisor makes sexual
overtures to workers of both sexes or where the conduct
complained of is equally offensive to male and female
workers..... In such cases, the sexual harassment would
not be based upon sex because men and women are
accorded like treatment. Although the plaintiff might
have a remedy under state law, . . . the plaintiff would
have no remedy under Title VII.'5
In Dundee, although the court found that the plaintiff had estab-
lished a prima facie case of hostile work environment, it con-
cluded that she was not entitled to an injunction to stop the
harassment as she no longer worked for the defendants, and
also that she could not be awarded "damages for mental suffer-
ing or emotional distress under Title VII." She could, how-
ever, "recover nominal damages if she prevails in a new trial
and thereby becomes eligible for an award of attorneys fees." 4
The Dundee test was later adopted either completely or as a
starting point for building a prima facie case in many of the
other circuits.
It was not until four years later, in 1986, that another
watershed case in hostile work environment sexual harassment
was decided: the Sixth Circuit's Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. m
In Rabidue, the court considered, in its analysis, the fact that the
plaintiff was "a capable, independent, ambitious, aggressive,
intractable, and opinionated individual"-a woman who moved
up from executive secretary to administrative assistant to credit
manager to office manager, who was, according to the record,
thought of as "an abrasive, rude, antagonistic, extremely will-
ful, uncooperative and irascible personality."' 6  In short,
according to the court, "plaintiff was a troublesome
employee. '"17 The defendant was an "extremely vulgar and
crude individual who customarily made obscene comments
about women generally, and, on occasion, directed such
obscenities to the plaintiff."' 8 Management was aware of this.
In addition, other males in the office displayed pictures of nude
or scantily clad women which plaintiff and other women were
13. Id. at 904.
14. Id. at 905.
15. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).




exposed to.' 9 The court set out the standard that many circuits
have followed since:
[A] plaintiff, to prevail in a Title VII offensive work envi-
ronment sexual harassment action, must assert and prove
that: (1) the employee was a member of a protected
class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcomed
sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature; (3) the harassment com-
plained of was based upon sex; (4) the charged sexual
harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering
with the plaintiff's work performance, and creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment
that affected seriously the psycho logical [sic] well-being
of the plaintiff; and (5) the existence of respondeat supe-
rior liability.20
To begin with, as in Dundee, the court held that the "plaintiff
must demonstrate that she would not have been the object of
harassment but for her sex."' 2' In addition, instances of com-
plained of sexual harassment that prove equally offensive to
male and female workers would not support a Title VII sexual
harassment charge because both men and women were
accorded like treatment.2 2 The court held:
sexually hostile or intimidating environments are charac-
terized by multiple and varied combinations and frequen-
cies of offensive exposures. . . .To accord appropriate
protection to both plaintiffs and defendants in a hostile
and/or abusive work environment sexual harassment
case, the trier of fact, when judging the totality of the cir-
cumstances impacting upon the asserted abusive and
hostile environment ... must adopt the perspective of a
reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment
under essentially like or similar circumstances .... 2
The particular plaintiff would then:
also be required to demonstrate that she was actually
offended by the defendant's conduct and that she suf-
fered some degree of injury as a result of the abusive and
hostile work environment. Accordingly, a proper assess-
19. See id.
20. Id. at 619-20.
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ment... would invite consideration of such objective and
subjective factors as the nature of the alleged harass-
ment, the background and experience of the plaintiff, her
coworkers, and supervisors, the totality of the physical
environment of the plaintiff's work area, the lexicon of
obscenity that pervaded the environment of the work-
place both before and after the plaintiff's introduction
into its environs, coupled with the reasonable expecta-
tion of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that
environment.24
Under this analysis, the court concluded that the findings
in each case "would be different depending upon the personal-
ity of the plaintiff and the prevailing work environment and
must be considered and evaluated upon an ad hoc basis."25
The court noted approvingly the district judge's opinion that
"[s]exual jokes, sexual conversations, and girlie magazines may
abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change this."2 6
Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim on the basis that
the defendant's "obscenities, although annoying, were not so
startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff
or other female employees," and that:
the sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis
effect on the plaintiff's work environment when consid-
ered in the context of a society that condones and pub-
licly features and commercially exploits open displays of
written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-
time television, at the cinema, and in other public
places .27
Rabidue is remarkable, however, not for the majority opinion,
but for the dissent of Judge Keith. Judge Keith's dissent
changed the course of sexual harassment law in that it
encouraged courts to be more sensitive to the perspective and
perceptions of women.
Judge Keith, in his oft-cited opinion, dissented and found
that "[t]he overall circumstances of plaintiff's workplace evince
an anti-female environment."28 In Judge Keith's view, "the
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 620-21.
27. Id. at 622.
28. Id. at 623. Judge Keith also noted some of the details from the
record, such as the longtime poster which "showed a prone woman who had
a golf ball on her breasts with a man standing over her, golf club in hand,
yelling "Fore" and the defendant's constant referral to women as "whores,"
"cunt," "pussy" and "tits," as well as his comment in reference to plaintiff,
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reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide
divergence between most women's views of appropriate sexual
conduct and those of men."' 9 Instead, he
would have courts adopt the perspective of the reason-
able victim which simultaneously allows courts to con-
sider salient sociological differences as well as shield
employers from the neurotic complainant ... unless the
outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defend-
ants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain
ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by
the offenders, in this case, men.3 0
Judge Keith found fault with the majority's position on the
plaintiff's 'assumption of the risk' factor, saying, "Title VII's
precise purpose is to prevent such behavior and attitudes from
poisoning the work environment of classes protected under the
Act."" He also disagreed with the majority's consideration of
the defendants' backgrounds, analogizing, "[n]o court analyzes
the background and experience of a supervisor who refuses to
promote black employees before finding actionable race dis-
crimination."' s2 More generally, he found "these subjective
factors create an unworkable standard by requiring the courts
to balance a morass of perspectives."3 3 He believed that the
"society" touted by the majority,
must primarily refer to the unenlightened; I hardly
believe reasonable women condone the pervasive degra-
dation and exploitation of female sexuality perpetrated in
American culture .... The presence of pin-ups and mis-
ogynous language in the workplace can only evoke and
confirm the debilitating norms by which women are pri-
marily and contemptuously valued as objects of male sex-
ual fantasy. That some men would condone and wish to
perpetrate such behavior is not surprising.... [T]he rele-
vant inquiry at hand is what the reasonable woman would
find offensive, not society, which at one point also con-
doned slavery. 34
"All that bitch needs is a good lay." Id. at 624. He also noted the
inconsistencies in the record involving the plaintiff's alleged "abrasiveness"
and "aggressiveness." Id.
29. Id. at 626.
30. Id. (citations omitted).
31. Id.
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Judge Keith concluded that sexual posters and anti-female lan-
guage could affect both the work performance and the psycho-
logical well-being of women, and that "the hostile environment
standard set forth in the majority opinion shields and condones
behavior Title VII would have the courts redress. 35
The hostile work environment sexual harassment issue
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the same year that Rabidue
was decided. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, s6 the Court
divided up sexual harassment cases into "hostile work environ-
ment" and "quid pro quo" claims, and held that unless a victim
is claiming "quid pro quo" harassment, the victim must show
that the harassment created a "hostile" or "offensive" work
environment.3 7 The Court also determined that a victim of
sexual harassment who has engaged in sexual activities with a
supervisor need not show that her participation was "involun-
tary," but merely that the sexual advances were "unwel-
come."38  The Rabidue and Vinson cases greatly expanded
societal awareness of the legal existence of hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment, and the federal circuit courts
began to resolve some of the questions left open by these two
cases.
II. RESOLVING THE QUESTIONS LEFr OPEN IN HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Although the area of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment has developed rapidly in recent years, the federal courts
have yet to devise uniform standards. One commentator
claims that there are two questions left open by both the EEOC
and the courts: when is harassment pervasive enough to con-
stitute a violation, and through whose viewpoint (that of a rea-
sonable plaintiff, a subjective plaintiff, a reasonable defendant,
35. Id. at 627-28. A year later, in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630
(6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit reversed itself and agreed with Judge Keith:
In a sexual harassment case involving a male supervisor's
harassment of a female subordinate, it seems only reasonable that
the person standing in the shoes of the employee should be the
'reasonable woman' since the plaintiff in this type of case is required
to be a member of a protected class and is by definition female.
Id. at 637. In a footnote, the court cited Judge Keith's dissent and added,
"Were this a sexual harassment case involving a male subordinate, the 'rea-
sonable man' standard should be applied. We acknowledge that men and
women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior."
Id. at 637 n.2.
36. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
37. Id. at 65-68.
38. Id. at 68-69.
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or a subjective defendant) are we to judge "pervasive? ' 3 9 In
the wake of Vinson, I would add a third question-how is "wel-
comeness" to be determined?
A. Pervasiveness
In the federal circuits, there is currently a wide variety of
perspectives on the degree of "pervasiveness" of harassment
required to establish a hostile work environment claim. Judi-
cial opinions may vary greatly, even within a circuit. For exam-
ple, in Waltman v. International Paper Co. ,40 the plaintiff brought
charges of hostile environment sexual harassment against her
employer, the International Paper Company (IPCO). The har-
assment had begun when a co-worker broadcast obscenities
about Waltman over the mill powerhouse public address sys-
tem. Other employees began to make suggestive comments to
Waltman. When Waltman complained to her supervisor, he
told the employees to stop, but no one was punished or written
up in the files, and Waltman was transferred to another unit.
Waltman's new supervisor, Garrett, urged her to have sex with
a co-worker, and himself touched Waltman in offensive ways-
such as pinching her buttocks with pliers and trying to put his
hands in her back pockets. Waltman received over thirty por-
nographic notes in her locker, and other employees continued
to make suggestive comments to and proposition her. The
powerhouse and restroom walls, as well as the elevator, were
covered with sexually explicit pictures, graffiti, and drawings of
naked men and women. 4 Waltman reported all of this to a
manager who allegedly told her that she "should expect this
type of behavior working with men."4 2 This supervisor did not
discipline anyone or investigate Waltman's claims-instead, he
transferred Waltman. An IPCO employee told a truck driver
from another company which did business with IPCO that
Waltman was a "whore" and would get hurt if she did not keep
her mouth shut. Another IPCO employee told Waltman that
"he would cut off her left breast and shove it down her throat"
39. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title
VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1984).
40. 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989).
41. Id. at 471. In a footnote, the court noted that etched in paint in
eight inch letters on the elevator was the inscription,' "Sue [Waltman] is a
whore." On the walls there were the inscriptions, "Sue sucks everybody's
dick," "I am going to eat Sue's pussy," and "Sue has a nice pussy." Id. at 471
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and later "dangled Waltman over a stairwell, more than thirty
feet from the floor."' 43 In addition to the continuing and con-
stant lewd and suggestive comments to Waltman, there were
two further incidents. One employee pinched her breasts, and
another grabbed her thigh. At this point, Waltman left work
when she suffered a psychological illness, allegedly due to the
harassment. She reported this to her supervisor, who reported
this to his supervisors, who then met with Waltman.44
IPCO did not reprimand Garrett or any of the others who
had harassed Waltman, nor did IPCO further investigate any of
Waltman's claims. After the meeting, IPCO sent Waltman a
letter saying that in order to investigate, they had to identify
her. The letter stated that if she pursued the investigation, it
would "hurt her chances of a promotion and make it impossi-
ble for her to work at the mill." 45 Waltman never did invoke
the formal grievance procedure at the mill. The only apparent
action taken by IPCO was to wash the graffiti off the walls occa-
sionally, and to require plant supervisors to read the plant pol-
icy on sexual harassment out loud at a shift meeting. During
this reading, however, several workers laughed and com-
mented that "women provoke sexual harassment by wearing
tight jeans. '"46 Waltman returned to work. A "few days after
this shift meeting, an IPCO employee grabbed Waltman's
breasts and directed a high pressure hose at her crotch."' 47 At
this point, Waltman quit and brought charges.
The district court granted a motion for summary judgment
for the defendants. It held that most of Waltman's claims were
time-barred 41 under Title VII and under state law, as they "did
not constitute a continuing violation."49 In addition, the dis-
trict court found no sexual harassment under Title VII because
IPCO "did not know and should not have known" of the
alleged harassment and that when IPCO learned of the harass-
ment, it took prompt remedial action.50 Waltman appealed,
and the EEOC filed an amicus brief urging reversal of the dis-








48. The district court held that all of Waltman's claims were time-
barred, except for the incident involving the high pressure air hose, which
occurred at the end of her employment. Id. at 473.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 482.
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IPCO argued that Waltman had not produced sufficient
facts to raise an issue regarding whether the incidents of sexual
harassment are "recurring and not isolated." They claimed
that there was:
(1) no evidence to demonstrate that the people harassing
Waltman were acting in concert; (2) there was not a man-
agement level policy encouraging such behavior; (3) it
was not the same person harassing Waltman and some
people only harassed her on one occasion; and (4) too
much time elapsed between specific incidents of
harassment.52
The court responded:
This court has never suggested that a plaintiff bringing a
claim of sexual harassment must show a conspiracy
among the harassers to prove a continuous violation....
The fact that not all the incidents of harassment involved
the same people does not show a lack of recurrence or
frequency. . . . [G]aps between the specific incidents to
which Waltman testified do not demonstrate a lack of
continuity.53
Indeed, the court suggested that, under Vinson, "a hostile envi-
ronment claim usually involves a continuing violation .. .an
individual feels constantly threatened even in the absence of
constant harassment. '54 It determined that in looking at the
frequency of harassment:
the focus should not be a mechanical calculation. Rather,
in light of Meritor Savings Bank [Vinson], the court should
review the pattern and frequency of the harassment and
determine whether a reasonable person would feel that
the environment was hostile throughout the period that
formed the basis of the plaintiff's claim. Waltman's evi-
dence of incidents of harassment coupled with the evi-
dence of sexual graffiti throughout the powerhouse could
support a finding that the acts of harassment were suffi-
ciently recurrent to create a continuously hostile
environment. 55
Pattern and frequency, as well as severity, have become the
standard elements in determining whether harassment is per-
vasive enough to be actionable.
52. Id. at 475.
53. Id. at 475-76.
54. Id. at 476.
55. Id.
19921
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While the district court had found that Waltman did not
produce sufficient evidence of the existence of a hostile envi-
ronment, IPCO's knowledge of the harassment or IPCO's fail-
ure to adequately remedy the situation, the appellate court
disagreed. It found that Waltman needed to prove her prima
facie case at trial, but only needed to show a genuine issue of
material fact regarding each element to survive summary judg-
ment. The court defined "unwelcome" as "sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal and physical con-
duct of a sexual nature that is unwelcome in the sense that it is
unsolicited or unincited and is undesirable or offensive to the
employee."56 The court concluded that Waltman's claims were
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment,"5 7 that IPCO potentially had both actual and construc-
tive notice, and remanded for a full trial on the merits.58
Judge Edith H. Jones dissented vigorously. She found that
the sexual harassment which took place over a period of two
and one half years, "consists of several isolated incidents of
unwanted physical contact, an obscene statement made over
the plant public address system, plus several remarks
addressed to her."59 The disconsonance between judge Jones'
dissent and the majority opinion regarding the same trial rec-
ord highlights the differences found in perceptions of "perva-
siveness." Judge Jones thought "several factors counsel
against allowing a hostile environment to proceed in this case."
These factors included the fact that "only co-workers and non-
employees [in general not supervisors]" were harassing the
plaintiff, that "only one man was involved in more than one
physical incident," and that the "incidents were spaced well
apart chronologically." 6" In effect, Judge Jones argued that the
incidents of harassment were not "frequent" enough. Judge
Jones noted that IPCO had taken action, and that Waltman had
"never resorted to the company grievance procedure."'" She
found that Vinson cannot be reconciled with the majority's posi-
tion that "even a woman who was never herself the object of
harassment might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to
56. Id. at 477. This issue of "welcomeness" is more thoroughly
addressed infra part II B.
57. Id. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986))
(emphasis added).
58. Id. at 478, 482.
59. Id. at 483.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 484.
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work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was perva-
sive. "62 She went further and suggested that the "unwelcome-
ness" standard in Vinson "lends a subjective component to the
definition."6 Moreover, she found that the Vinson 'severe and
pervasive' qualifications,
are intended to set an objective floor on allegations of
sexual harassment. Such language does not, for instance,
suggest that whenever a victim feels abused, she has a
cause of action under Title VII. . . .We have so little
social consensus in sexual mores nowadays that, short of
incidents involving unwanted physical contact, it is
impossible generally to categorize unacceptable sexual
etiquette. It is likewise impossible to eradicate sexual
conduct from the workplace-without unthinkable
intrusiveness.6
Judge Jones complained that the majority "creates the unpalat-
able possibility that a woman might sue her employer for con-
sensual conduct that others undertook among themselves.''65
She concluded, "Surely, such invasions of privacy cannot have
been the object of banning sexual harassment in the work-
place."66 While I strongly disagree with Judge Jones' conclu-
sions based on the record, she does point out one of the most
serious problems with the developing law of standards in sex-
ual harassment cases: how does one balance the individual
protections granted by the First Amendment to the defendant
against the injustice of some of the crude, harassing and offen-
sive verbal attacks made by them to plaintiffs in the
workplace?67
Other circuits have adopted tests for pervasiveness similar
to Waltman. For instance, in a Second Circuit case, Carrero v.
New York City Housing Authority,6 8 a plaintiff appealed "from a
judgment that found her subjected to a hostile working envi-
62. Id. (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
Judge Jones also noted that as for lewd language or graffiti, the "EEOC
guidelines explicitly exempt incidental uses of offensive language" and do
not refer to graffiti at all. These factors "suggest" to Judge Jones that "these
matters may not be so severe or pervasive as to constitute actionable sexual
harassment." Id. at 484 n.5.
63. Id. at 484.
64. Id.
65. Id. Plaintiffs in other circuits have done just that.
66. Id.
67. These first amendment concerns are more fully addressed infra part
III.
68. 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
1992] 555
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ronment on account of her sex. '"69 While working for the City
Housing Authority, the plaintiff was transferred after she was
"subjected to insulting and demeaning conduct by co-workers,
one of whom dropped his pants in front of her."7 ° She perse-
vered, and was eventually made assistant superintendent. Her
supervisor, Peterson, who was known to be "flirtatious," was at
first friendly and cooperative. However, he later began to
make sexual advances to plaintiff, touching her knee and kiss-
ing her neck. Even after she made it "crystal clear ... that she
wanted him to stop touching her," he continuously attempted
to touch and kiss her.7 ' At one point, after threatening to fail
her on a probationary report, he again stroked her arm and
tried to kiss her-at which plaintiff struck him across the nose
with a ruler, knocking his eye glasses off. Soon after, he pub-
licly criticized her work performance, reducing her to tears.7 2
The defendants in Carrero argued that:
Peterson's conduct, though not a paradigm of modem
inter-gender workplace relations, was not pervasive
enough to trigger relief under Title VII, and federal law
does not punish "trivial behavior" consisting of only
"two kisses, three arm strokes," several degrading epi-
thets and other objectionable-but ultimately harmless-
conduct.73
Although the court quoted an earlier Second Circuit case, Lopez
v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 7 which said that incidents must be more
than episodic-they must be sufficiently continuous and con-
certed in order to be deemed pervasive7 5-it disagreed with the
defendants:
We emphatically reject this argument. A female
employee need not subject herself to an extended period
of demeaning and degrading provocation before being
entitled to seek the remedies provided under Title VII. It
is not how long the sexual innuendos, slurs, verbal
assaults, or obnoxious course of conduct lasts. The
offensiveness of the individual actions complained of is
also a factor to be considered in determining whether
69. She appealed because, other than ordering reinstatement, her
claims for compensatory damages were denied, and the amount for attorney's
fees granted was less than she had requested. See id. at 572.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 573.
72. See id.
73. Carrero, 890 F.2d at 578.
74. 831 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1987).
75. See id. at 1189.
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such actions are pervasive. A complaining employee is
required to prove that such conduct was unwelcome, that
the conduct was prompted simply because of the
employee's gender, and that the conduct was sufficiently
pervasive to create an offensive environment antithetical
to the priority of merit-not sex or some other prohib-
ited criterion-in the workplace.
76
Thus, the court believed that "offensiveness" of conduct is a
factor in pervasiveness, as well as the duration of the harass-
ment. Note, however, that the court did not factor in "fre-
quency." Carrero concluded, "The facts here plainly
demonstrate that Peterson's conduct was unsolicited and
unwelcome and that Carrero's working environment was perva-
sively altered by his advances." 7 7 Furthermore, Peterson's
position as Carrero's immediate superior and chief evaluator
gave him "a position of power over her that, in combination
with his unwelcome sexual advances, was tantamount to coer-
cion," and "created for appellant a hostile working environ-
ment in violation of Title VII.
' 78
The Eighth Circuit has yet another test which takes into
account acts of harassment directed at other employees in addi-
tion to those directed at the plaintiff in determining pervasive-
ness. In Hall v. Gus Construction Co.,79 the court affirmed a
magistrate's ruling in favor of three plaintiffs who brought hos-
tile work environment claims. The women, all single mothers
in their thirties, were hired as traffic controllers by Munsdorf.
The women were subjected to nonstop sexual abuse by male
members of the construction crew-incessantly referred to as
"fucking flag girls."' The term was even used by their super-
visor Munsdorf on one occasion. Crew members wrote
"Cavern Cunt" and "Blond Bitch" on one plaintiff's car, and
plaintiffs were repeatedly asked if they "wanted to fuck."'"
Munsdorf talked to crew members, but verbal abuse soon
resumed and the women later quit. In addition to the verbal
assault, there was offensive unwelcomed physical touching.
The men would corner plaintiffs between two trucks, reach out
the windows and rub their hands down the womens' thighs.
One man picked up one of the plaintiffs and held her up to a
cab window so other men could touch her. Munsdorf observed
76. Carrero, 890 F.2d at 578.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 1012.
81. Id.
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this incident and did nothing. 2 The men also pulled their
pants down and mooned the women, flashed obscene pictures
of naked couples engaged in oral intercourse, and urinated in
the plaintiffs' water bottles.83
On appeal, the defendants argued that "the district court
erred in not distinguishing between conduct of a sexual nature
and other forms of harassment," and that "the harassment...
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect a condition of
employment." 4 In addition, the defendants, who had taken to
calling one of the plaintiffs "Herpes" after she experienced a
severe sun allergy, argued that this was not sexual, but instead
"analogous to 'Scarface,' a nickname Al Capone wore proudly
but which might bother a more sensitive person."8 " In
response to a charge that they had urinated in plaintiff's gas
tank, the defendants retorted that this "was a practical joke...
not conduct of a sexual nature."8 6 The court responded that a
claim, "need not be clearly sexual in nature.... Intimidation
and hostility toward women because they are women can obvi-
ously result from conduct other than explicit sexual
advances."87
In addition, the court found that the work conditions were
indeed "sufficiently severe or pervasive," commenting, "each
of the women was subjected to a plethora of offensive inci-
dents."8 8 More important, the court broke from some of the
other circuits, holding that "evidence... directed at employees
other than the plaintiff is relevant to show a hostile work envi-
ronment."8 9 The court concluded:
[W]e note that the conduct and language complained of
went far beyond that which even the least sensitive of
persons is expected to tolerate in this era of generally
impoverished discourse. In this day when certain so-
called comedians command millions for spewing forth on
film language of the drill field, perhaps each of us, con-
sciously or not, has become inured to that which even
two short decades ago might have been considered
beyond the pale of colloquial speech. Title VII does not
mandate an employment environment worthy of a Victo-
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1013.
85. Id. at 1013 n.4.
86. Id. at 1014.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1015.
89. Id.
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rian salon. Nor do we expect that our holding today will
displace all ribaldry on the roadway .... [I]n the heat and
dust of the construction site language of the barracks will
always predominate over that of the ballroom. What
occurred in this case, however, went well beyond the
bounds of what any person should have to tolerate. [The
plaintiffs themselves expected and used profanity.] They
did not expect, however, the unrelenting pattern of ver-
bal, physical, and psychic abuse to which they were ulti-
mately subjected.90
The court attempted to draw the line as to where office give-
and-take becomes abuse - a line which is being addressed
more often as society begins to re-examine what behavior is
appropriate in the workplace.
The following two cases reflect the extremes in "pervasive-
ness" questions-where one incident is enough to find a suffi-
ciently pervasive hostile environment, and where one incident
is not enough. In Bohen v. City of East Chicago,9 the Seventh
Circuit held that a single act can be enough to constitute hos-
tile work environment sexual harassment. 92 In Bohen, the sex-
ual harassment consisted of pelvic contact, profane and lewd
language by immediate supervisor, and descriptions of sexual
fantasies by male employees targeting Bohen. 93 According to
the court, "Forcing women and not men to work in an environ-
ment of sexual harassment is no different than forcing women
to work in a dirtier or more hazardous environment than men
simply because they are women." 9 4
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit held that a specific single
incident was not pervasive enough to be helpful in drawing
lines between acceptable and unacceptable workplace behavior.
In Cobbins v. School Board of Lynchburg,9 5 the court affirmed a
summary judgment for the defendants on a sexual harassment
claim because the plaintiff was not able to make out a prima
facie case. The plaintiff, a teacher, claimed sexual advances
and disparate treatment, but the only evidence the court found
was that the defendant, the principal at the school, had once
90. Id. at 1017-18.
91. 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
92. See id. at 1186-87.
93. See id. at 1182-83.
94. Id. at 1185-86. On the other hand, although the court found hostile
work environment and sexual harassment, it noted that no damages could be
awarded under Title VII, and that only Congress can amend Title VII to
grant damages. See id. at 1184.
95. No. 90-1754, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 526 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 1991).
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asked her out for a glass of wine and had reprimanded her on
another occasion for refusing to perform certain tasks that she
saw as secretarial.96 Both the district and appellate court
agreed that the totality of the circumstances did not amount to
"the creation of a pervasively hostile work environment due to
her gender." 97 The supervisor's request was not harassment
because 1) he did not attempt to pressure her into accepting
the offer, 2) he did not attach the offer to any job-related
incentive, and 3) he did not ask again after Cobbins refused
the offer.98 The court noted that the EEOC has also deemed a
single request okay. The court concluded, "a one-time
request-absent coercive elements and demands-is not suffi-
cient to have 'altered the conditions' of Cobbins' workplace. 99
The development in the circuit courts of a test which con-
siders both severity and frequency of harassment is encourag-
ing. Under the severity/frequency test, a single incident may
be considered pervasive if it is severe, but less offensive behav-
ior must be more frequent to rise to the level of pervasiveness.
The Ninth Circuit seems to have revolutionized not only this
concept of pervasiveness, but other aspects of the hostile work
environment claim as well. In a ground-breaking decision, Elli-
son v. Brady,' 00 the Ninth Circuit developed a new test to deter-
mine when "conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of employment and create a hostile working
environment." ' 01 In Ellison, an IRS agent filed charges of sex-
ual harassment when one of her fellow employees began hang-
ing around her desk, "pestering" her, and writing her strange
and sexual notes and letters. Initially, the IRS attempted to
address the problem. They transferred the co-worker, but
eventually allowed him to return to the plaintiff's office. The
plaintiff then filed charges with the IRS and obtained a tempo-
rary transfer to another office. The co-worker sought joint
counseling and wrote the plaintiff "another letter which still
sought to maintain the idea that he and Ellison had some type
of relationship."' 2 The IRS agreed that the conduct consti-
tuted sexual harassment, but did not find "a pattern or prac-
tice" as required by the EEOC guidelines. 10 3 When the EEOC
96. Id. at *2.
97. Id. at *7.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *8.
100. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 873.
102. Id. at 874-75.
103. Id. at 875.
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affirmed the steps taken by the IRS, the plaintiff took her case
to a district court which in turn affirmed the EEOC's ruling.10 4
The Ninth Circuit reversed, recognizing "that sexual har-
assment is a rapidly expanding area of the law."' 0 5 The court
reaffirmed a test set forth in Jordan v. Clark,"0 6 a Ninth circuit
decision which held that in order to prove hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that:
1) she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature; 2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and
3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of her employment and create an
abusive working environment.' 0 7
In response to the government's argument in Ellison that its
employee's conduct toward the plaintiff was not of a sexual
nature, the court replied, "the three page letter.., makes sev-
eral references to sex and constitutes verbal conduct of a sexual
nature."'0 8 The court made a de novo review as to whether the
conduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive," and disagreed
with the district court that the conduct was "isolated and genu-
inely trivial."' 09 It found that the Supreme Court in Vinson had
"implicitly adopted the EEOC's position that sexual harass-
ment which unreasonably interferes with work performance
violates Title VII .... Conduct which unreasonably interferes
with work performance can alter a condition of employment
and create an abusive working environment."" 0 Commenting
that the employee's conduct "falls somewhere between forcible
rape and the mere utterance of an epithet," as well as being
less "pervasive" than the sexual comments and advances in
other previous Ninth Circuit cases,"' the court declined to fol-
low the standards in the Rabidue" 2 decision. It rejected both a
104. Id.
105. Id. at 875 n.4.
106. 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988).
107. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875-76 (quoting Jordan, 847 F.2d at 1373).
108. Id. at 875 n.5.
109. Id. at 876.
110. Id. at 877.
111. Id.
112. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). The court also noted that the Sixth
Circuit has "called Rabidue into question in at least two subsequent
decisions." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877 n.6. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (adopting the holding that sexual harrassment
should be viewed from the victim's perspective); Davis v. Monsanto Chemical
Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989)
(criticizing the Rabidue decision and its limited reading of Title VII).
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"search for 'anxiety and debilitation' sufficient to 'poison' a
working environment""' and Rabidue's "requirement that a
plaintiff's psychological well-being be 'seriously affected.' "114
Instead, the court decided:
It is the harasser's conduct which must be pervasive or
severe, not the alteration in the conditions of employ-
ment. Surely, employees need not endure sexual harass-
ment until their psychological well-being is seriously
affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilita-
tion. . . . Although an isolated epithet by itself fails to
support a cause of action for a hostile environment, Title
VII's protection of employees from sex discrimination
comes into play long before the point where victims of
sexual harassment require psychiatric assistance.'
Finding that the coworker's conduct was "sufficiently severe
and pervasive," the court noted that "the required showing of
severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely
with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.""' 6
The court went on to make several unprecedented state-
ments in a sexual harassment case. First, the court said:
We note that the reasonable victim standard we adopt
today classifies conduct as unlawful sexual harassment
even when harassers do not realize that their conduct cre-
ates a hostile working environment. Well-intentioned
compliments by co-workers or supervisors can form the
basis of sexual harassment .... This is because Title VII
is not a fault-based tort scheme. "Title VII is aimed at
the consequences or effects of an employment practice
and not at the . . . motivation" of coworkers or
employers." 1
7
Second, the court explained that "in some cases the mere pres-
ence of an employee who has engaged in particularly severe or
pervasive harassment can create a hostile working environ-
ment.""" Under this standard, employers may have to remove
employees from the workplace if their mere presence would
render the working environment hostile in the eyes of a reason-
able victim, may have to dismiss employees who harass other
113. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78.
114. Id. at 878.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 880 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir.
1971)).
118. Id. at 883.
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employees when there is no way to schedule them at different
places or times, and, at a minimum, must educate and sensitize
their workforce. The court got around notice problems by say-
ing that "only in very, very few cases will harassers be unaware
that their conduct is unlawful when that conduct is so serious
that a reasonable victim would thereafter consider the har-
asser's mere presence sexual harassment.""' 9 Explaining why
it is the harasser who must be "rescheduled," the court stated,
"[w]e strongly believe that the victim should not be punished
for the conduct of the harasser," i.e. "should not have to work
in a less desirable location as a result of an employer's remedy
for sexual harassment."' 2 °  Finally, the court reversed,
remanded, and supported its holding with statistics concerning
the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace in gen-
eral, and the enormous cost ($267 million) to taxpayers of sex-
ual harassment among federal employees.12 '
B. Perspective
Ellison provides a nice transition to the issue of whose per-
spective to adopt in finding that a work environment is hostile.
Ellison adopted the "reasonable woman" perspective in an
attempt to be progressive and empathetic to the perceptions of
women. In determining whose perspective should be used to
resolve whether conduct is harassment, the court decided to
focus on the perspective of the victim-in this case, that of the
reasonable woman:
If we only examined whether a reasonable person would
engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the
risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination.
Harassers could continue to harass merely because a par-
ticular discriminatory practice was common, and victims
of harassment would have no remedy.' 22
This focus requires "an analysis of the different perspectives of
men and women. Conduct that many men consider unobjec-
tionable may offend many women."' 2 3 The court further justi-
fied its standard:
We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints
among women as a group, but we believe that many
women share common concerns which men do not neces-
119. Id. at 883 n.19.
120. Id. at 882.
121. Id. at 880 n.15.
122. Id. at 878.
123. Id.
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sarily share. For example, because women are dispropor-
tionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have
a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behav-
ior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual har-
assment may understandably worry whether a harasser's
conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault.
Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view
sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of
the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that
a woman may perceive.'
24
Thus, the court held that "a female plaintiff states a prima facie
case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she
alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider suf-
ficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment."' 125 By the
same token, in the case of a male plaintiff, "the appropriate vic-
tim's perspective would be that of a reasonable man."' 26 Rec-
ognizing that the reasonable woman standard will shield
conduct that many women today would find offensive, the court
apologized, "[f]ortunately, the reasonableness inquiry which
we adopt today is not static. As the views of reasonable women
change, so too does the Title VII standard of acceptable
behavior." 127
Another reason the court gave for adopting the reasonable
woman standard was that "a sex-blind reasonable person stan-
dard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore
the experiences of women."' 1 2 ' The court assured that the
reasonable woman standard does not establish a higher
level of protection for women than men. Instead a gen-
der-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables
women to participate in the workplace on an equal foot-
ing with men .... [and allows courts to] work towards
ensuring that neither men nor women will have to 'run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of
being allowed to work and make a living.' "129
The court found that under the facts of this case, although the
alleged harasser could be portrayed as "a modern-day Cyrano
124. Id. at 879.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 879 n.ll.
127. Id. at 879 n.12.
128. Id. at 879.
129. Id. at 879-80 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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de Bergerac wishing no more than to woo Ellison with his
words" who "harbored no ill will toward" her, a reasonable
woman might well have considered the conduct "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter a condition of employment and cre-
ate an abusive working environment." 3 0 Thus, the court con-
cluded that a "reasonable woman" standard would be most
appropriate in determining whether conduct is harassment.
In a thoughtful dissent, however, Judge Stephens found
the term "reasonable woman" to be "ambiguous and therefore
inadequate." ' 3' He noted that women are not the only
"targets" of sexual harassment and disputed the assumption
that men do not have the same sensibilities as women. He then
suggested alternatives "more in line with a gender neutral
approach" such as " 'victim,' 'target' or 'person.' "132 He
pointed out that Title VII was created to eliminate differential
treatment of men and women; not to spawn it.' 3 3 He also
believed that the majority was misguided in focusing on the vic-
tim's perspective and conduct, rather than on that of the har-
asser, as this focus has been abused in other fields such as rape
law: "Modern feminists have pointed out that concentration by
the defense upon evidence concerning the background,
appearance and conduct of women claiming to have been
raped must be carefully controlled by the court to avoid effec-
tively shifting the burden of proof to the victim."13 4 Judge Ste-
phens' analysis is persuasive.
To determine whose viewpoint or perception should be
used to decide whether harassment is sufficiently hostile and
pervasive to meet the elements of a hostile environment claim,
most of the circuits seem to have adopted the dual (objective/
subjective) test-first determining whether a reasonable plain-
tiff would have been affected, and then determining whether
this particular plaintiff was affected. This, in a sense, puts the
plaintiff through double hoops: the plaintiff must prove both
that a reasonable plaintiff would have been affected, and that
she herself was affected. Whether or not this more difficult test
is appropriate will depend on what becomes of Title VII. 135 In
addition, the courts vary on whether to employ a reasonable
woman, a reasonable victim, or a reasonable person test. The
130. Id. at 880.




135. See infra Part III for discussion on possible additions or
amendments to Title VII.
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reasonable victim standard is preferable as it avoids the "rea-
sonable woman" trap (of discriminating to avoid discrimina-
tion) which may become increasingly problematic as the legal
system becomes more truly gender neutral' 6-if indeed this is
the case, and we are not instead moving backward toward dis-
parate legal treatment of the sexes. In addition, the reasonable
woman standard disallows the same sensitivity on the part of
men. Even if men and women "view similar behavior differ-
ently," this is not a phenomenon which should be encouraged.
Going further, one commentator recently asked, "Why, despite
scholarship revealing that judicial definitions of reasonableness
often reflect the values and assumptions of a narrow elite, is the
'objective test' seen as an accurate reflection of societal norms
at all?"'3 7 Although another commentator argued that we do
not need to worry about male victims who feel like the more
"sensitive' ''reasonable woman" as males are not a protected
class under Title VII,' 38 this argument not only side-steps the
issue of how to treat men and women equally without denying
their different perceptions of behavior, but also flies in the face
of many federal circuit holdings that males are a protected class
under Title VII.L' 9 Finally, as Susan Estrich has argued
recently, in another context,
The male domain .. . [i]s protected by manipulating
these doctrines to embrace female stereotypes which real
women cannot meet. It is protected by a definition of
reasonableness that pits this woman against that ideal,
that pits one woman against the rest. It is protected by
punishing women who are weak for their weakness, and
women who are exceptional for their strength. It is pro-
tected, in short, by the operation of sexism in law. 4 '
Based on these rationales, the most effective and just stan-
dard to adopt may be the "reasonable victim" standard, or in
the larger sense, a 'new improved' reasonable person. As our
society becomes increasingly diverse, one of two scenarios may
136. "Truly gender neutral" does not envision the present system in
which the male-dominated society has used a supposed "neutral" approach
to disguise its male bias.
137. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology
of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990).
138. Martha Sperry, Comment, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and
the Imposition of Liability Without Notice: A Progressive Approach to Traditional
Gender Roles and Power Based Relationships, 24 NEw ENG. L. REV. 917 (1990).
139. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding, as early as 1982, that males are a protected class under Title VII).
140. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 815 (1991).
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result. First, we may break the reasonable person down into
more and more precise categories: reasonable woman, reason-
able black woman, reasonable Catholic black woman, etcet-
era. 4 ' Although a Catholic black woman will have a unique
perspective, it is simplistic to assume that her experience may
be projected onto all Catholic black women. Another problem
with this approach is that it may encourage different standards
of conduct for different groups of people, thereby becoming a
potential tool in the hands of the currently dominant group. 142
The better solution is to expand our legalistic "reasonable per-
son" to embrace the perceptions of emerging groups.
Although with this approach, the actions of the "reasonable
person" would be less predictable, certain minimum standards
of behavior could probably be agreed upon. This would
encourage dominant groups to make room for emerging
groups as they find their social, economic, and political voices.
C. Unwelcomeness
Regardless of which perspective is adopted, this only leads
to the third question of "unwelcomeness." In actual trials,
determining whether sexual advances and comments were
"welcome" is going to be a tricky issue. The First Circuit
addressed "welcomeness" as well as other elements of hostile
work environment sexual harassment in Lipsett v. University of
Puerto Rico.' 4 3 In Lipsett, a female university medical student
made out prima facie cases of both hostile work environment
and quid pro quo sexual harassment. The court held that to
make out a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual har-
assment, the "plaintiff must show that he or she was subjected
to unwelcome sexual advances so 'severe or pervasive' that it
altered his or her working or educational environment."'' 44
The defendant may then show that the events did not take
place or were "isolated or genuinely trivial."' 45 Under this
type of hostile environment sexual harassment, the conduct
141. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir.
1987), for the proposition that "discrimination against black females [could]
exist even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white
women."
142. Again, see Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir.
1987), where Judge Seth missed the point and pointed out in his dissent that
as no general "racial hostility" was found by the district court, it is difficult to
see what the sexual hostility would be aggregated with.
143. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).




568 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
"must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to... create an abu-
sive working environment.' "46 To determine whether such an
environment existed, the court looked to "the record as a
whole and the totality of the circumstances. "147
In addressing the issue of whose perspective should be
used in assessing unwelcomeness, the court admitted the
importance of the question because "often a determination of
sexual harassment turns on whether it is found that the plaintiff
misconstrued or overreacted to what the defendant claims were
innocent or invited overtures."'' 48 The court gave an example
of a supervisor who might mistakenly believe that it is "legiti-
mate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a 'great
figure' or 'nice legs' " while the female subordinate finds these
comments offensive but is afraid to criticize him.' 49  It
concluded,
both parties must make an effort to overcome this
dilemma. The man must be sensitive to signals from the
woman that his comments are unwelcome, and the
woman, conversely, must take responsibility for making
those signals clear. In some instances, a woman may
have the responsibility for telling the man directly that
his comments or conduct is unwelcome. In other
instances, however, a woman's consistent failure to
respond to suggestive comments or gestures may be suf-
ficient to communicate that the man's conduct is
unwelcome. 15
0
Citing a study which found that fifty percent of working women
and fifteen percent of working men are sexually harassed on
the job, as well as the by then well-known dissent of Judge
Keith in Rabidue,'5 ' the court noted that "[u]nless the fact
finder keeps both the man's and the woman's perspective in
mind, 'defendants as well as the courts [will be] permitted to
sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by
the offenders .... 52
146. Id. at 897-98 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986)).





151. 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (KeithJ. dissenting).
152. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986)).
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Although the alleged sexual harassment consisted of nick
names, hand-drawn pin-ups of the plaintiff and others, unwel-
come sexual advances, experiences of other women in this
environment, ratio of men to women in the university program,
threats to drive the plaintiff out, and anti-female commentary
toward the plaintiff and other women who had been driven out
of the program, the district court accepted the defendants'
claims that they were unaware of this treatment and issued
summary judgment in their favor.' The circuit court
responded, saying "[b]y accepting defendants' assertions in
their entirety, the district court turned the summary judgment
proceeding into a trial, and acted as a fact finder."' 54 The
court held that the plaintiff had made her prima facie case of
hostile environment sexual harassment merely by "specific alle-
gations that Drs. Rivera and Morales subjected her to repeated
and unwelcome sexual advances;"1 55 showings which were but-
tressed by the other alleged facts. The court also intimated
that the plaintiff could prove hostile environment sexual har-
assment by showing that male residents
subjected the plaintiff and other female residents to a
constant verbal attack, one which challenged their capac-
ity as women to be surgeons, and questioned the legiti-
macy of their being in the program at all. This attack,
although not explicitly sexual, was nonetheless charged
with anti-female animus, and therefore could be found to
have contributed significantly to the hostile
environment. '
5 6
In response to one of the defendant's contentions that the
remarks were "more in jest than in reality," the court
remarked,"Dr. Gonzalez' dismissal of these anti-female
remarks as mere 'jest' may demonstrate his insensitivity to
them. Belittling comments about a person's ability to perform,
on the basis of that person's sex, are not funny."' 57 The court
saw this situation as one of the clashes of perspective that it had
previously described, and admonished, "It could be that Dr.
Gonzalez thought that the comments in question were mere
jest,' but his reaction may reveal more about his role in
allowing the hostile environment to continue rather than about
153. See id. at 903-04.
154. Id. at 904.
155. Id. at 905.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 906.
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whether the comments were 'objectively innocuous.' ",158 The
court concluded by reassigning the case to a different trier on
remand. 1
59
While Lipsett looked to the perspective of the plaintiff in
solving the question of whether the harassment was "unwel-
come," the Vinson Court looked to the perspective of the
defendant. The Vinson Court seemed to suggest that it is the
obligation of the harassee to let the harasser know that his (or
her) attentions are unwelcome. Although the Vinson holding
may tend to "blame the victim," using the plaintiff's perspec-
tive is also problematic. The modern focus on the plaintiff's
perspective is bound to lead to attempts by defendants to show
that the plaintiff's perspective of welcomeness was not reason-
able. One commentator, arguing an evidentiary analogy
between rape and sexual harassment cases in regard to the
admissability of the plaintiff's past sexual history, observed that
defendants are likely to seek
to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's sexual experience
to show that, given her history, she is less likely to have
been offended by the defendant's conduct and its effect
on the work environment, or, if a particular individual is
not alleged to be the cause of the hostile environment, by
the general atmosphere at work. Alternatively, the
defendant might seek to introduce evidence of the plain-
tiff's lack of sexual experience to demonstrate that, in
light of the plaintiff's virginal or prudish history, she is
more likely to have been oversensitive and unduly
offended by what is actually "harmless" conduct or an
unoffensive environment.' 60
In this case, the plaintiff loses either way. We might learn from
the unjust treatment of plaintiffs found in the history of rape
case law.161 In a refreshing solution to this problem, another
commentator has found a clever way out of the dilemma: sug-
gesting that the defendant be required to prove that the plain-
tiff welcomed his specific advances. This rules out evidence of
the plaintiff's dress and past personal life in most of the cases,
and avoids "forcing women to dress or act in a subdued man-
ner lest someone misconstrue their behavior as a sign of wel-
158. Id. (quoting Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 637 F. Supp. 789
(D.P.R. 1986)).
159. The court noted that this was mere custom, and was no reflection
on the district judge. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 915.
160. Catherine A. O'Neill, Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of
Evidence: A Proposed Rule, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 236.
161. See generally id.
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coming sexual activity." '162 Although determining
"welcomeness" may become more important as the standards
regarding whose perspective to utilize are clarified and unified,
Estrich is correct in stating that
A hostile environment, the courts have consistently held,
must be based on objective criteria, evaluated from an
"objective" viewpoint. The fact that a particular woman
found the environment totally debilitating is beside the
point; the question is what other persons, often mythic,
would think.... [The] welcomeness serves as a means to
keep the focus on the woman rather than the supervisor;
on what she, rather than he, has done wrong; and on
whether she deserves to be treated with human decency,
rather than whether he violated the standards of decency
and humanity. '
6 3
Perhaps the best solution is to determine welcomeness using
the plaintiff's perspective, but imposing an objective require-
ment on the plaintiff to let the defendant know that his or her
conduct is unwelcome. This requirement has usually been met
by the time a sexual harassment case has reached the courts.
Allowing welcomeness to be determined by the perspective of a
reasonable victim will ensure two things. First, defendants will
not be permitted to subject plaintiffs to discriminating work
environments which they (the defendants) see as fair. Second,
defendants will not be subjected to standards of welcomeness
that are so subjective as to be unreasonable.
III. THE LARGER TENSIONS WITHIN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW
In determining which standards are most appropriate to
adopt, it is useful to explore the context in which they will be
utilized. There are several contradictions which must be
addressed by a potential hostile work environment sexual har-
assment test-that between the rights of individuals who are
harassed and the rights of free expression of the harassers; that
between federal Title VII and state tort law; and that between
competing policies of equality and compensation.
In the modern legal community, there is an ever increasing
tension between the rights of historically disadvantaged groups
to be treated by the community with equality and respect, and
162. Christopher P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A
Consideration of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual
Harassment, 76 B.U. L. REV. 445, 473 (1987).
163. Estrich, supra note 140, at 833.
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the rights of individuals to express freely their particular
prejudices, stereotyping, and antipathy toward these groups.
On the one hand, we wish to protect the freedom of expression
granted by the federal Constitution. On the other, we increas-
ingly recognize the rights of women and minorities such as
blacks to be included as fully privileged, empowered, and equal
members of the community. It is only now, in the late twenti-
eth century, that the protections of both types of rights have
been extended so far as to bring them into grinding tension
with one another.164
This tension is heating up in the rapidly expanding law of
sexual harassment. Women, in order to continue their infiltra-
tion of the male-dominated economic world, must have the
right to be treated as equal members of that world, as well as
respect and freedom from rampant hostility and abuse which
often follows from that equality. This surely includes the ban-
ishment of unwelcome physical touching and unwelcome sex-
ual overtures, and that of office pornography and obscenity.
Opponents argue that "name-calling" is not actionable and
should not be. Proponents respond that the rules have
changed-that women need some new empowerment in order
to stop the "name-calling." At one point, some names were
"fighting words"-words which are so insulting or "offensive"
as to have the effect of force, or at the least, to provoke violence
in the listener.' 65 Accordingly, as a society becomes more civi-
lized, law steps in and provides alternatives to raw escalative
violence. Ironically, as the larger society has become "liberal-
ized," and what were once deemed "fighting words" are now
constitutionally protected, individuals are much less protected
from the filthiest epithets and vilest names. One is barred from
fighting physically, but also left with little legal recourse. Per-
haps one might fight back with words, but the voice of one indi-
vidual is often drowned by the sea of voices arising from the
majority, particularly in workplaces where minorities and
women are frequently under-represented and outnumbered.
Are we left to stolidly accept harassment from our fellow
citizens?
By contrast, many are loathe to undercut the all-important
freedom of expression which has been so painstakingly built up
164. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) (involving statutes banning racial and sexual "hate speech" on
campuses, and pornographic calendars and obscene speech in the workplace
found to be sexual harassment).
165. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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in our legal system. In this nation, we have long accepted the
necessity of allowing obnoxious people to express obnoxious
views in order to preserve the sanctity of free speech.' 66
Indeed, the very minorities who are demanding the end of this
freedom of expression which allows them to be reviled might
well be the first to experience the backlash of such a move. For
it is this very freedom of expression-the flow of ideas, the use
of speech to educate the community-which has allowed
minority groups to bring about important changes in the laws
affecting them and to end unjustified stereotypical societal
thinking. Some of the people most insistent on bringing about
societal change are those most nervous about curtailing free
speech-and members of both conservative and liberal camps
find themselves confused about where the lines should be
drawn in balancing these issues. This confusion is particularly
relevant, at present, with the recent controversy surrounding
campus discrimination policies which penalize verbal harass-
ment.' 6 7 The same confusion has spilt over into the sexual har-
assment field in recent cases which hold that obscene and
offensive office "calendars," and pictures can automatically cre-
ate a sexually hostile work environment.
In the case of workplace sexual harassment, however, the
issue should be less controversial. Female plaintiff/employees
in the workplace are more closely analogized to a captive audi-
ence.' 68 Under this sort of analysis, "time, place, and manner"
restrictions might also apply as harassers are free to express
themselves off the job site. In addition, as the cases are primar-
ily being brought by women, they have federal anti-discrimina-
tion law as a potent weapon. The federal government has
regulated various aspects of employment-wages, health, and
discrimination-throughout this century. Why not sexual har-
assment and abuse? On the other hand, as Title VII has
become increasingly protective, for example through punishing
mere expression, First Amendment concerns become more
problematic.
Which leads to the next question: Should Title VII be the
weapon of choice in the battle against sexual harassment in the
workplace? There are problems with both the purposes and
remedies of Title VII. The purpose of Title VII seems to be to
166. See e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.
1978).
167. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Mich. 1989).
168. See generally Estrich, supra note 140.
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provide equality in the workplace for all employees, regardless
of race, sex, etcetera. Today, it is being used in sexual harass-
ment hostile environment cases to potentially undercut that
goal of equality. We want to free women in the work environ-
ment from its male-dominated hostility and abuse. However,
given the "workplace" situation as it stands today, in a sense,
the more equal we make women, the less equal we make men.
As we move closer to varying standards for actionable hostile
work environment claims for male and female plaintiffs (rea-
sonable women v. reasonable men), we also come closer to dis-
criminating against the "sensitive male" that feminists have
spent the last thirty years trying to create-in effect, breathing
new life into the old objectionable stereotypes. Courts love to
bring up the legal puzzle of the bisexual harasser, arguing that
if the harasser harasses both men and women, his conduct is
not actionable under Title VII as men and women are
"accorded like treatment."' 69 This analysis fails to acknowl-
edge that "like treatment" does not equal "good treatment."
In addition, courts are already acknowledging that if a harasser
makes unwelcome sexual advances to a woman because she is a
woman and he finds her attractive, this is actionable. Thus, one
might argue that if a bisexual harasser harasses men because
they are men, and women because they are women, the harass-
ment is still actionable in both cases. If we want to end legal-
ized harassment, we must either modify Title VII or find
another medium through which to bring these suits. Several of
the circuit courts have created a "reasonable plaintiff" or "vic-
tim" standard where a plaintiff will be subjected to a "reason-
able woman" standard if she is a woman, and to a "reasonable
man" standard (a standard under which it is more difficult to
recover) if he is a man. This not only perpetuates the negative
stereotypes mentioned above, but does not necessarily benefit
women either, as more attention becomes focused on the con-
duct of the victim rather than on that of the harasser.
Another problem with Title VII is that it purports to rectify
conditions in a given workplace-not to compensate an
employee who has been harmed physically or economically.
Title VII is most often utilized by employees who have already
been harmed. In recent cases, employees are bringing horrific
(evidencing incredibly offensive office practices) prima facie
hostile environment cases, spending a great deal of money and
years in court, and being awarded nominal damages of $1.00
and potentially, attorneys fees. For example, in Spencer v. Gen-
169. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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eral Electric Co. ,170 a plaintiff brought Title VII hostile environ-
ment and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims, as well as
several state law claims. The quid pro quo claim was dismissed
for failure to prove one element, and the state law claims were
also dismissed. The hostile work environment consisted of
derogatory and degrading comments about women in general,
sexual comments and rampant horseplay, dirty jokes and sto-
ries. 171 The plaintiff's department was isolated from the rest of
the company, and her supervisor would sit on his subordinate's
laps, putting his hands between their legs and down their
blouses, insisting that they call his pipe his 'little banger' and
throwing pennies down their blouses. The supervisor had had
consensual sexual relations with at least two of his female sub-
ordinates during plaintiff's tenure. Plaintiff alleged that the sit-
uation was culminated by his assaulting and raping her. 172 The
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that "[a]lthough
Spencer has shown that she was forced to work in a hostile
environment, she has not demonstrated that she suffered any
tangible loss as a result of Neal's conduct."' 17' The district
court found her economic claims "speculative," and although
"the Graphics Office was a workplace at odds with good man-
ners, good taste, professionalism and most importantly, Title
VII," it awarded the plaintiff only $1.00 in damages. 174 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed. 1
75
Over the last few years, the Seventh Circuit has devised an
interesting way around this common problem of no compensa-
tory, nominal or punitive damages for sexual harassment under
Title VII: using the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, in Volk v. Coler,176 the court held
that sexual harassment amounts to sex discrimination under
the Equal Protection clause. The court further developed its
sexual harassment jurisprudence in King v. Board of Regents of
170. 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990).
171. Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 219 (E.D. Va.
1988).
172. Id. at 214.
173. Id. at 219.
174. Id. Although the supervisor had been shown to be lying several
times during his testimony through impeachment, both the district and
appellate court chose to believe him instead of the plaintiff in several key
discrepancies. This was noted in the Fourth Circuit opinion, in a dissent by
Judge Murnaghan. Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 664 (4th Cir.
1990).
175. Spencer, 894 F.2d 651.
176. 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988).
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University of Wisconsin System, 1 7 7 In King, the plaintiff, an assis-
tant professor, became concerned when Sonstein, the assistant
dean, began making suggestive innuendos toward her as well as
leering at her in a sexually suggestive fashion.' 78 He became
"progressively more bold and offensive" in his sexual behavior
toward King-he would "touch her, rub up against her, place
objects between her legs, make suggestive remarks and com-
ment upon various parts of her body."' 79 Other faculty mem-
bers noticed and commented upon this behavior. Things came
to a head when Sonstein followed King into a bathroom at the
yearly Christmas party and told her he "had to have her" and
that "he would have her."'"8 King protested, but Sonstein
"forcibly kissed and fondled her."'18 1 Sonstein relented when
King's boyfriend entered the bathroom. He also tried this on
other women once King left the party, despite repeated
requests that he stop.182 After this incident, King and Sonstein
discussed the situation, and Sonstein refrained from harassing
King for the next year and three months.'8 3
The court decided that under environmental sexual har-
assment, "a loss of tangible job benefit is not necessary since
the harassment itself affects terms or conditions of employ-
ment." ' 84 It must, however, "deny the plaintiff 'the right to
participate in the work place on equal footing with others simi-
larly situated.' "185 Although affirming the fact that a single
incident may constitute a hostile environment, the court stated
that "generally, repeated incidents create a stronger claim of
hostile environment, with the strength of the claim depending
on the number of incidents and the intensity of each inci-
dent."' 8 6 Upholding the plaintiff's hostile work environment
claim, the court noted that under Title VII she could only seek
reinstatement, back pay, and attorney's fees [and not compen-
satory, nominal or punitive damages].' 8 7 Even recovery of
back pay (after plaintiffs are driven to quit and/or bring law
177. 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990).
178. Id. at 534.
179. Id. at 534-35.




184. Id. at 537.
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suits) is extremely limited under sexual harassment claims as
there is often no loss of tangible job benefits.
Consequently, instead of treating the case as a Title VII
violation, the Seventh Circuit applied an equal protection anal-
ysis to the claim. The court maintained that although "the pre-
cise parameters of this cause of action have not been well
defined," the plaintiff must prove the defendant had intent to
harass the plaintiff."' 8 The court upheld King's claim under
the equal protection clause, rejecting Sonstein's assertion "that
his actions were merely the result of his desire for King as an
individual and, therefore, were not sex-based harassment."'18 9
The court noted that in this new cause of action, "[n]o hatred,
no animus, and no dislike is required."' 190 It rejected Son-
stein's claim that "it was King as an individual to whom he was
attracted, not King as a woman. 191 Instead, the court found:
"Sonstein's sexual desire does not negate his intent; rather it
affirmatively establishes .... [that h]is actions were based on
her gender and motivated by his libido."' 92 Using the Equal
Protection clause to analyze sexual harassment claims is an
interesting and attractive option for courts and plaintiffs in the
fast developing field of hostile work environment sexual
harassment.
The Eighth Circuit has also suggested a new proposal for
dealing with harassers under Title VII. In Jones v. Wesco Invest-
ments, Inc.,' 93 Rose, the president of Wesco, sexually harassed
188. Id. In a Title VII action, on the other hand, the inquiry is
supposedly solely from the plaintiff's perspective. Id. at 537-38. Some courts
seem not to recognize this.
189. Id. at 538.
190. Id. at 539.
191. Id.
192. Id. Judge Manion dissented. He disagreed with the majority's
"conclusion that Steven Sonstein violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when he sexually harassed Catherine [sic] King." Id.
at 542. Judge Manion found the pivotal question to be "whether the
apparent hostile atmosphere resulted from Sonstein's discriminatory
treatment of King based on her membership in a class-female . . . or
whether it was confined to a "group" of persons (King) with whom Sonstein
had sought to have a romantic affair." Id. Judge Manion concluded that
Sonstein "harassed King because he was physically attracted to her albeit
because she was, in his mind, an attractive woman .... [He] put King in a
class by herself as his romantic target." Id. Judge Manion felt that as
"Sonstein harassed Katherine King because she was Katherine King, not
because she was female," King failed to meet the standard of the Equal
Protection Clause which is tougher than that of Title VII: "[s]uch activity
may be actionable, but not as a violation of the U.S. Constitution." Id.
193. 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988).
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the plaintiff Jones with repeated sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature.'94 Rose would come up behind Jones and rub his
hands up and down the sides of her body, touching her breasts.
Once, he put his hand up her dress on her outside thigh;
another time he kissed her lips. He made comments such as
"someday her breasts would be his," and that "he could see
her nipples much better in cool temperature." 95 Jones contin-
ually stated that she Wanted a business relationship, pushed
Rose away, and removed herself from the room. In a footnote,
the court stated that a "court must consider any provocative
speech or dress of the plaintiff in a sexual harassment case...
[g]iving Meritor [Vinson] due consideration, we observe from the
record that Ms. Jones wore non-provocative clothing."' 96
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of a
hostile work environment in which it not only gave Jones back
pay, interest, and attorney's fees, but also required Wesco to
post a specifically worded notice advising Wesco employees
that their employer does not tolerate sexual harassment, and
required Rose to post the same notice at every business he
presently or in the future owns.' 97 The Eighth Circuit noted
that, "Indeed, any other result would have been a miscarriage
of justice.""'9 Additionally, the court voiced its disgust at the
defendants' argument that since not all sexual harassers are
married, if we do not allow romance in the office, there will be
no more workplace dating blossoming into love and eventually
into marriage.' The defendants had argued that "[i]f civil lia-
bility is implanted on an employer for its employees' natural
interaction between the genders, either the collapse of our
commercial system or the end of the human race can be fore-
seen." 200 The court found this argument unpersuasive and
also noted that both plaintiff and defendant were married.
Although the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have created
interesting solutions to some of the problems plaintiffs encoun-
ter while bringing sexual harassment claims under Title VII,
the other circuits have not followed suit, and plaintiffs are still
suffering for the lack of adequate remedies under Title VII.
Because plaintiffs seem worse off in the end (even if the suit is
194. Id. at 1155.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1155 n.4.
197. Id. at 1156.
198. Id. at 1156-57.
199. Id. at 1157 n.6.
200. Id.
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successful and hostile work enviroment is found, they may be
left with no job, no money, and possibly a poor reference),
potential plaintiffs with meritorious claims are discouraged,
and employers feel no pressure to modernize their policies. A
further problem has been that courts are confusing Title VII
with tort law: giving plaintiffs only the limited remedy brought
by Title VII but at the same time holding them to the stricter
standards found in tort law.2 ' This is perhaps the worst aspect
of Title VII sexual harassment cases. 2
While Title VII does not seem to be remedying harms to
plaintiffs, the common law tort system is not faring any better.
There is not yet a tort for sexual harassment specifically. Plain-
tiffs attempt to bring these claims under "extreme and outra-
geous behavior," and "intentional infliction of emotional
distress," but courts simply respond that although the plaintiff
has suffered an injustice, the behavior of the defendant does
not fit under either of these causes of action. In addition, any
attempts to go further with state tort law in the area of sexual
harassment could potentially be pre-empted by the federal
Title VII. Because Title VII, a federal statute, already
addresses sexual harassment claims, Congress arguably occu-
pies the field. This may mean that states cannot impose stricter
requirements on workplace behavior if the requirements con-
tradict those of Title VII.
The solution to remedying sexual harassment harms seems
to lie with somehow modifying Title VII. At present, there are
two possible alternatives. First, we might leave Title VII as it
stands-not punishing or compensating, but instead loosening
the standards and tests for sexual harassment, so that work-
places are cleaned up more quickly. This might entail issuing
injunctions before plaintiffs and defendants have spent lots of
money and years in court. The second option is to leave in
place the more difficult-to-meet sexual harassment tests and
standards, making sure that plaintiffs are bringing meritorious
claims and defendants are culpable, but give Title VII some
teeth. This would entail amending the act through the legisla-
ture to include potential punitive and compensatory damages.
201. See Barton, supra note 162.
202. On an interesting note, the legislature tried to rectify the problem
in the vetoed Civil Rights Act of 1990. In the Act, the legislature suggested
supplying a punitive damages remedy for Title VII sexual harassment claims.
The entire Act was vetoed by President Bush. President Bush, however,
recently signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provides for
punitive damages for plaintiffs under Title VII. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991).
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Congress appears to have accepted the second option. Con-
gress has found that "additional remedies under Federal law
are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional dis-
crimination in the workplace, '20 ' and in November of 1991,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was signed into law. In a new sec-
tion, the Act added punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination including sexual harassment. 20 4 Because puni-
tive damages were added, the tests probably should remain
adequately stringent to ensure defendant culpability in order to
avoid due process problems. This is especially true where a
company whose upper management may or may not have had
knowledge of the harassment is being fined large amounts of
money for the acts of its employees.
As the law has stood until now, employers had nothing to
lose by turning a deaf ear to complaints of sexual harassment.
At most, plaintiffs received nominal damages, reinstatement,
and possibly attorneys fees. Attaching larger penalties to Title
VII violations will raise the consciousness of employers, who
may, in turn, take more steps to deter potential harassers.
After surveying many of the recent cases at the circuit level,
Congress' adoption of the second option was for the best.
Allowing punitive and compensatory remedies gives plaintiffs
with meritorious claims a well-deserved chance to collect dam-
ages for their harms. At the same time, if the present standards
are maintained in cases involving punitive and compensatory
damages, it gives greater assurance that some of the more friv-
olous claims will not be allowed.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that although the circuit courts have
progressed a great deal in interpreting hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment actions, neither Title VII nor state law
adequately addresses the problem. Either the new buttressing
of Title VII by the legislature must be carried out in the federal
circuit courts, or courts must lower the burden of proof stan-
dards for Title VII and state law plaintiffs who are not asking
for punitive or compensatory damages. The latter will be less
prejudicial to defendants' rights as the relief is injunctive (rein-
statement of position, etc.), and the purpose is equalization of
203. Id. at 105 Stat. 1071.
204. To 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Act adds § 1977A, which allows for
punitive and compensatory damages in cases of intentional discrimination.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
Id. at 1071, 1072-74.
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the workforce, not punishment. The problem with arming
Title VII with punitive damages for sexual harassment is that
this may defeat the policy underlying the statute-the policy of
rectifying discriminating work situations, rather than punishing
offenders. In addition, now that Title VII is armed with puni-
tive damages, plaintiffs are even less likely to get lesser burden
of proof standards rather than only injunctive relief. In many
cases, the remedies previously provided by Title VII were both
appropriate and sufficient. I would have maintained the milder
injunctive relief and lesser burden of proof requirements under
Title VII, but also have encouraged the state courts to develop
a common (or statutory) civil tort for sexual harassment. This
would eliminate over-burdening plaintiffs who merely want
injunctive relief, while allowing for justice (in the form of com-
pensation damages for victims and punitive damages against
culpable defendants) in some of the more appalling cases. Of
course, the quickest solution would be a federal statute which
prohibits sexual harassment, and allows for private claims-
plaintiffs could then bring claims in both state and federal
court. After Congress' bumbling treatment of the Thomas
confirmation hearings and the heightened public awareness of
the issue of sexual harassment that has flowed from it, going
beyond its perhaps token modification of Title VII and drafting
a federal statute at this point might be just the way for Con-
gress to redeem itself.
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